The speed of the news in the weeks since Trump’s inauguration means that any comment is hostage to fortune. However, it is fair to say that the new President has already ended the NATO alliance as it once existed. No backpedalling, or even change of administration, can repair the fundamental breach of trust between the United States and Europe, and as the soon-to-be Chancellor of Germany has said, “It is clear that [the Trump administration] does not care much about the fate of Europe.” As I write, Europe is bracing itself for a possible evacuation of the US troops that have been stationed on the continent since 1945. While there is a possibility of a peace deal, Russia would have to accept NATO peacekeepers on its borders and a negotiated end to the Ukrainian conflict, the USA would have to agree to security guarantees and Ukraine would have to agree to significant territorial loss, none of which seem certain or even likely. So, if Europe is to defend itself from now on, and if the Ukrainian conflict is to continue, many important questions must be answered, but at drastically different levels of urgency.
The next few months
Trump has already announced a pause on military aid to Ukraine and has suspended intelligence sharing (and barred the UK from sharing US-derived intelligence). While Starlink has not been shut off for the Ukrainian armed forces, we would be foolish to assume that isn’t coming.
This is a potential disaster for Ukraine. Many of the systems Ukraine relies on are American and there is good reason to believe that the Ukrainian system of war itself is based on what it receives from the Pentagon. Of particular urgent concern are the lack of intelligence sharing, equipment relating to air defence – particularly the US Patriot missile system – and access to Starlink – which undergirds Ukraine’s command and control systems.
Without access to these systems, the skills that maintain them, and their spare parts, Ukraine will have to rethink how it is to fight and reconstitute the capabilities these systems combined to create. This is a dangerous manoeuvre to pull off mid-war when the Russians are facing no such impediments. It is, however, something the Ukrainians have done before. Beginning with a post-Soviet military armed with a few Western anti-tank missiles, as their equipment mix has changed, Ukrainian forces have taken advantage of every style of fighting – from guerilla tactics to combined arms warfare to the drone-heavy trench warfare currently being fought in the Donbas.
It is essential that Europe supplies whatever military equipment Ukraine needs to build a new way of waging this war, quickly. In many cases, there will not be direct analogues. While Europe can step in to replace US 155 mm rounds, any European alternative to Patriot would be partial, and there is no substitute for Starlink. That means the Ukrainians may need weapon systems not previously supplied, and we should supply them without the usual delay involved in deciding whether this will escalate the conflict. There is no time for that.
While this switchover is made, it would also be wise to keep an open line of communication to the White House and its mercurial occupant. What we cannot supply, Trump may permit us to buy, at least in the short term. Relying on this channel, however, is sadly no longer an option.
The next few years
If the Russian invaders can be held off throughout 2025 with only European supplies, there will be more questions for Europe to answer. Can Europe supply what is necessary for Ukraine to win? Can Europe deter Russian aggression everywhere? And can Europe prevent a far-right takeover that threatens strategic unity?
To answer the first question, if Ukraine can hold the Russians in 2025 with only European equipment, that bodes very well for their victory in the conflict overall. This is a war of attrition but is also a war in which the Russians are taking disproportionate losses – over 1000 casualties per month. Today’s Russia has an older population that is half the size of the old Soviet Union and has lost more men in Ukraine than the Soviets had when they withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. They are also reaching the end of the Soviet stockpile of many key systems. It is not a given that Ukraine cannot hold on long enough to break this Russian regime.
If the current European weapon systems are enough to maintain Ukraine’s position, then to win, Europe will need to continue the supply until victory is achieved, as well as keep up with the war’s development. This should be a simple matter; the EU’s economy alone is ten times the size of Russia’s, and while manufacturing will need to be scaled up and bottlenecks overcome, there is no reason to think that Europe cannot outproduce Putin and his pawns. Equally essential will be to keep up with the way war is changing. Communication, drones, and AI are particular areas to closely study, and a close integration of the Ukrainian defence sector into Europe’s will pay dividends.
This rosy picture belies the political truth of Europe’s position, however, which is that more European countries could fall to destabilising populist right parties, many of whom see Putin as more of an ally than Zelensky. A particular worry is France, a crucial ally that will decide in 2027 whether they finally want to hand Marine Le Pen the keys to the Élysée Palace. It is not impossible that the shattering of the Western alliance has only just begun.
The next few decades
In the longer term, Europe can no longer rely on the United States to be a strategic partner and ally. The purchase of modern weaponry is often as much a subscription plan as it is a one-time expense. Software updates, spare parts, and the right to export weapons to allies are all jeopardised when purchasing American hardware. This means the Americans must be cut out of our supply chains. Planes, missiles, and satellite communications – we need to be able to purchase and maintain these capacities ourselves. For the UK, the costliest items will include replacements for Trident and, eventually, F-35. Europe will have to build a defence industry capable of supplying everything required, and that will be expensive. It is this imperative, rather than immediate Ukrainian need, that is driving the recent rise in defence budgets. Ukrainian conflict
With a globally competitive defence industry, the next question is whether Europe can become a security exporter. Can we create a system that will deter the Russians (especially in the Caucasus where we don’t share a border), show strength to America and play a useful role in promoting peace, prosperity, and democracy in the Middle East and Africa, even if for no other reason than to prevent waves of refugees?
Does Europe have a clear strategic role? Without a steadfast ally across the pond, how do we feel about the rise of China? The defence of Taiwan? Nuclear proliferation in Iran? The threat to Japan from North Korea?
Keir Starmer and the UK
As the little ships were evacuating the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk, it was clear that the world had changed, the Anglo-French alliance had failed, and a new warfare with new technology had washed the old assumptions away. We are once again in this position, and once again, the UK can be at the centre of world affairs. Due to the wildly different time scales in which these decisions are taking place, however, the Prime Minister will risk looking uncoordinated and indecisive.
In the short term, Sir Keir should maintain the traditional “bridge” role of the UK and Europe, maintaining Ukrainian access to American weapons for as long as possible, whether this be by aid or purchase – this might be decisive. So, prepare to host Trump for a state visit.
At the same time, the UK will have to supply Ukraine with everything they need to move beyond their dependence on US weapons. This could mean temporarily denuding our own defence or the defence of other Eastern allies. The truth to remember in these decisions is that these weapons are built to deter the Russians, so whether they are used against them now in the Donbas or later in Baltic region makes little difference to us, but every difference to Ukraine.
Over the next few years, we will have to reduce weapons imports from the US and invest in building our own capabilities. This may well clash with whatever grovelling we will have to do in the short term.
Strategically, we also need to produce a system to prevent the resurgence of the far-right. The UK should lead the way on this as our two-party system gives us some immunity from a backlash. This will require a regulation of social media companies and investment in the information space – the likes of which we haven’t seen since the war – and if JD Vance’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference are anything to go by, it will also risk drawing the ire and perhaps a trade war with the United States. So it goes.
Finally, there will need to be new institutions to unify European defence and agree on a worldwide strategy. The UK is an essential player both for our military might and global perspective. Traditionally, the UK, a strongly Atlanticist power, has been sceptical of anything that undermines NATO, so a switch in policy will be seismic and may herald lasting change.
As the institutions of the last century collapse, we will need to create new ones that will define how we keep the peace in this century. As the 80th anniversary of VE day approaches, we must look forward, as well as back, to toasting victory in Europe.