Whilst Friday’s election result was widely reported as a victory for reformism, Pezeshkian finds himself surrounded by clerical obstructionism, with shaky reformist credentials to begin with. This article will look at Pezeshkian’s views and ask if he can truly be considered a reformist.
Towards the end of his reign, Mohammad Reza was quoted as saying “Thank God we in Iran have neither the desire nor the need to suffer from democracy”. The last Shah of Iran would therefore likely not have been totally disappointed with the work of his successors in 2021. Whilst usually permitting a relatively pluralist political arena, 2021 saw virtually all reformist candidates blocked from participation. Raisi’s impressive victory of 72% was weakened by a record low turnout of 48%. With younger Iranians increasingly less confident in peaceful change, 2022 saw many took to the streets in protest against systematic abuses by the so-called ‘morality police’ following Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody.
It was within this context that the Guardian Council took a laxer approach in vetting candidates, allowing reformist participation. This was evidently not enough to win opponents back over, with the first round seeing a turnout of 39.9%, the lowest in the nation’s history. Hashtags referring to those who voted as ‘traitors‘ spread across social media, despite the historic jailing of Iranians for promoting electoral boycotts. Whilst the second saw a 10% uptick, this was generally interpreted as being a vote against hardliner Saaed Jalil winning the runoff, rather than an endorsement of his opponent.
His opponent and eventual winner of the presidency was Masoud Pezeshkian, widely referred to as a ‘reformist’. The Reformist label is one that he has rejected in the past, once referring to himself as a Principlist (an adherent to the principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution) when in the government of Mohammad Khatami. It is undeniable, however, that in comparison to his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, Pezeshkian is a reformist. However, most people sound Reformist when compared to someone who was in charge of something called ‘The Death Committee‘.
Foreign Policy
Pezeshkian diverges most dramatically from his predecessor with his advocacy for stronger relations with the West. Whilst condemning the United States as “terrorists” following the US killing of Qasem Soleimani in 2019, he has advocated for better relations with the United States, advocating a restart to the Iran Nuclear Deal, something opposed by his predecessor. He also seeks co-operation with the Financial Action Task Force, an organisation which currently blacklists the country. It seems unlikely, however, that this position is reciprocated.
The United States has condemned the elections as “not free or fair”. When asked if the Biden administration would be willing to restart nuclear talks following Pezeshkian;s elected, White House National Security Advisor John Kirby was clear “They’re still supporting terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. They’re still supporting the Houthis as the Houthis attack ships in the Red Sea.” He said, “So, no”. It was a stance that Republicans were quick to reiterate. It seems unlikely that a possible change in America’s own president later will affect this stance.
Pezeshkian push for stronger international ties has one exception, however, in his own words he would push to “have friendly relations with all countries except Israel”. Iranian State TV reported on his letter to Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, in which he reiterated for the organisation against “the illegitimate Zionist regime”. In the same letter, he reiterated his commitment to “the ideals of the late Imam Khomeini [Iran’s first Supreme Leader]”.
The feeling appears to be mutual, with confusingly named Israeli Foreign Minister, Israel Katz calling for tougher sanctions on the IRGC, with the Times of Israel less diplomatically referring to Pezeshkian as a “Pro-Terrorism Clown”. Katz has, however, simultaneously argued that this election result shows “demand for change and opposition to the Ayatollah regime”.
Pezeshkian has maintained support for the ‘Axis of Resistance’ more broadly, an alliance of militias, governments and terrorist organisations aligned with Iran. Outside of a desire to restore the nuclear deal and ease sanctions, Pezeshkian diverges very little with his predecessor. On the American front, the upcoming election makes a shift by the Biden administration highly unlikely.
Domestic Policy
When protests wept Iran in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death, Pezeshkian criticised the way that protests were handled as ‘unconstitutional‘. Despite this, he has strongly condemned the protests. His campaign has focused on opposing violent crackdowns, internet shutdowns and has even flirted with repealing Iran’s mandatory laws on head-coverings. This change would be a significant reversal of Iran’s status-quo.
A core demographic in Pezeshikan’s victory has been ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic Azeris and Kurds in Iran’s northwest. Ethnic minorities have been particularly active in anti-regime demonstrations. Pezeshikan has pledged to improve minority rights.
What can Pezeshkian actually do?
Iran is the only country in the world where the President is not the head of state. Since the revolution, Iran’s supreme leader has served in this role, exercising an effective veto over virtually all actions a president takes. Under the constitution, the President is expected to work under the ‘guidance’ of the Supreme Leader. Pezeshkian also faces restrictions in cabinet appointments. His cabinet, set to be appointed by the 20th of August will have to be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran’s parliament. His legislative agenda would similarly have to pass through this body. The most recent legislative elections, in march of this year, was widely boycotted by the opposition, leaving the assembly dominated by hardliners.
Where does this leave Pezeshkian’s domestic and foreign agenda? In August of 2022, a month before the death of Mahsa Amini, Ebrahim Raisi signed a decree tightening restrictions on head coverings. It is unlikely that the Supreme Leader would approve any attempt by Pezeshkian to rescind such a decree. Other, more complex policies would require legislative approval from the Consultative Assembly.
One of the few policies he may get through the assembly would be his reforms to minority autonomy. Whilst hardliners have long advocated harsh crackdown on ethnic separatism, Pezeshkian has framed the policy as a way of reducing dissent.
Final Thought
Pezeshkian’s candidacy was likely permitted by the clerical establishment to ease tension with dissidents. Friday’s low turnout makes it unclear how effective this will be.
Pezeshkian’s agenda, already limited in scope, will likely be gridlocked by other branches of government. History shows us that, whilst helpful in the short term, will be bad for the regime in the long run.
Muhammad Khatami, elected as a reformist in 1997, saw his promises of reform blocked by other organs of government. The visible failure of his government to enact change turned an entire generation off the idea of change within the system, eventually resulting in the 2009 protests. If regime stability is Khalmeni’s goal, a lame duck semi-reformist is likely bad news.
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This article was written by Chamber’s features writer, Alex Connor